



CONDUCTING USER ACTIVITY WITH YOUR EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE

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- US Army (Retired), Intelligence Operations Officer
- Counterintelligence (CI), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Signals Intelligence Collection (SIGINT)
- Certified DoD Cyber Crime Investigator
- Professor of Digital Forensics at The George Washington University and the University of Maryland University
- Master of Science and Technology Intelligence from the National Intelligence University
- Master of Engineering (Cybersecurity) from The George Washington University
- Doctorate in Public Administration (Science and Technology Policy) from Valdosta State University
- Corporate experience in implementing insider threat and cybersecurity governance in government, corporate, and non-profit organizations.



Terminal Learning Objectives


- Understanding what you want to monitor
 - Crown Jewels Assessment
 - Planning your UAM program
- Resource assessment
 - Data Assessment
 - Tool Assessment
 - Resource Efficiency
- Implementing the solution
 - Tuning your existing cyber tools
 - Monitoring

It's MacGyver Time

How can I best protect my organization with the assets I have?

How can I reduce the insider threat attack surface of my organization with limited resources?

How can I use cybersecurity tools to manage insider threat risk?



You can do it

BUT NOT SO FAST

- “Given the time, it is possible to tune your existing cybersecurity tools to detect insider threats”
- You will experience failures in your quest to implement a UAM program because of the follow issues:
 - Failure to plan
 - Failure to understand your data
 - It is a secondary task
 - You do not have enough resources
 - You try to do too much, too fast



Where do
we want
to go and
how do
we get
there?

*"If you don't know where you are going,
you might wind up someplace else."*

• Yogi Berra


Picking Your Destination

- What do I want to detect?
- What data do I need to detect it?
- How am I going to detect it?
- How am I going to analyze the data?
- What do I do once I find something?
- What am I required to do?
- What other resources do I need?
- Is UAM going to be a secondary task or will I hire a dedicated team?




Crown Jewels Assessment

PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS WITH EFFICIENCY



UAM Tools Perspective

UAM TOOL EVOLUTION



Countermeasures

USER ACTIVITY MONITORING TRIAD

People


- Trained analyst able to recognize InT behavior
- A fool with a tool, is still a fool

Process

- Is what I am doing legal/what data can I look at?
- What do I do when I catch someone?
- If you do not already have good cybersecurity and governance policies, a new process will not help you.

Technology

- Data
- Establish triggers or thresholds
- Alerting



Measurements

FINDING THE METRICS THAT MATTER

- Without data, you are just another person with an opinion.
 - If you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it.
 - Measure what you need to know,
 - Report on what you want to change
 - Be consistent, especially important for analysis over time.
 - Use Dashboards
-
- Data: A signal, stimulus, or fact
 - Information: A collection of data in a series, or otherwise organized
 - Knowledge: Information placed into relevant context
 - Wisdom: The ability to put knowledge into practical use

Data Sources

THE MOST BANG FOR YOUR BUCK

Where I am likely to experience a risk?
How do I monitor for that risk?

Important Data sources:

- Printmon (Quantity, Type)
- Antivirus (Numerous events)
- DLP (Frequent burning, type of data)
- Proxies (unauthorized activity, competitor)
- Netflow (Internal network probing)
- Evtx (Log on/Log Off, Security, Log Clear)
- Email server (Data, Competitor)



Understanding Human Behavior


USING YOUR SIEM TO FIND ANOMALIES

- What else can we look for?
- A user doing something he has never done before
 - Printing from a new printer
 - Visiting new websites
 - Working different hours
 - Job searching
- A user doing something outside the norm for his peer group
 - Larger than normal printing
 - Burning disks
 - Contact outside the organization
- A user violating the laws of space-time.
 - A user should not be on vacation and logging in at work at the same time
- Even if a user trips one of these triggers he is not “guilty” of being an insider threat
- More monitoring may be warranted

Finding Evil Using Hypotheses


DETERMINING WHAT TO LOOK FOR

- Insider Threats will exhibit behavior that can be defined as “abnormal.”
- To find evil you must know what is normal
- E.g. “It is suspicious when a user is three standard deviations away from normal when analyzing print volume.”
- Therefore you must have a tool that allows you to analyze behavior across a population.
- Visualization is key
- May be harder to detect low and slow attacks, but those users will eventually fall outside the norm




Process Control Chart

PROCESS IS OUT OF CONTROL



Process Control Chart

- RULE OF 7
- PROCESS IS TRENDING OUT OF CONTROL



Suspicious Document Printing

TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

Printmon Index

Top Secret

Q New Search

eventtype=printmon_windows host="*" printer="*" document="*Top Secret*" user="*" | table host, printer, status, total_pages, document, user, submitted_time, size_bytes

✓ 4 events (10/5/18 1:00:00.000 PM to 10/12/18 1:25:50.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns Statistics (4) Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

	host	printer	status	total_pages	document	user	submitted_time
1	[REDACTED]	HRNH95-A237-MF-A	spooling	1	Microsoft Word - Top Secret Debriefing.docx	[REDACTED]	10/09/2018 12:23:15.258
2	[REDACTED]	HRNH95-A237-MF-A	spooling	1	Microsoft Word - Top Secret Debriefing.docx	[REDACTED]	10/09/2018 12:23:15.258
3	[REDACTED]	HRNH95-A237-MF-A	spooling	1	Microsoft Word - Top Secret Debriefing.docx	[REDACTED]	10/09/2018 12:22:52.255
4	[REDACTED]	HRNH95-A237-MF-A	spooling	1	Microsoft Word - Top Secret Debriefing.docx	[REDACTED]	10/09/2018 12:22:52.255

Top Secret
Debriefing.docx

User Name and
DTG

Print Volume

AVERAGE PAGES PER USER

Identifying High Volume Users

New Search

eventtype=printmon_windows | stats count by user | stats avg(count) by user

✓ 36,837 events (10/11/18 2:00:00.000 PM to 10/12/18 2:07:07.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events (36,837) Patterns Statistics (1,341) Visualization

50 Per Page Format Preview


< Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ... Next >

	user	count
1	[REDACTED]	1167
2	[REDACTED]	1090
3	[REDACTED]	1045
4	[REDACTED]	1045
5	[REDACTED]	1045
6	[REDACTED]	768
7	[REDACTED]	303
8	[REDACTED]	248
9	[REDACTED]	205
10	[REDACTED]	182
11	[REDACTED]	101
12	[REDACTED]	92

Make Your Bed Everyday

DOING THE SIMPLE "STUFF" WELL

- Using cybersecurity policies to your advantage
 - Do you have a user agreement?
 - Do you have a Privileged Access Agreement?
 - Do you provide cybersecurity awareness training?
 - Do you enforce a vacation policy?
 - Do you have segregation of duties?
 - Do you continually assess who has access to data



Use of Other Cybersecurity Tools

- Incident Response/Forensic
 - Review system files
 - Deleted files
- Application
 - Application monitoring
 - Installed new applications
 - Disabled antivirus or other security software
- Defense (Phishing)
 - Do user click phishing emails
- Awareness
 - Visually monitor employees



If everything is important, nothing is

YOU CANNOT WATCH EVERYONE ALL THE TIME

- Set priorities
- Use policies to strengthen your program
- Who has access to your data
- What do they do with it
- Why do they need access
- Who authorized their use of the data
- What are the data flows?
- Do they still need access?
- Focus on privileged Users
- Use Human Intelligence (HR, Legal, Tips)

